The Alford Plea: Black, White, Grey, or Green?

A British defendant once protested, "As God, is my judge, I'm innocent." To which a jurist, Lord Birkett, responded, "He isn't. I am; you're not."

Of the five possible pleas of a defendant, guilty is by far the most common. Standing mute, or refusing to plea, and nolo contendere, or accepting guilty punishment but not admitting liability, are less common. The least common plea of all, then, would be the Alford plea.

It's controversial nature, and the fact that the acceptance of the Alford plea is left to the discretion of the court, both contribute to it's lowly status on the "popular plea totum pole."

The Alford plea originated from the Supreme Court case, North Carolina v. Alford (1970). The case notes that, "An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime when a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt"

(http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/alford-plea/)

As mentioned in the text, judges are at odds with defendants who use the Alford plea for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the Alford plea allows defendants to maintain their innocence while accepting the reasonable possibility of guilt; however, in many courts, a defendant is expected to admit guilt on the record to be charged with the crime and given punishment. Secondly, and less profoundly, judges just plain-old don't like it.

I too wrestle with the idea of the Alford plea. On the one hand, I can see where the need for justice and the probability of guilt unfairly coincide with an innocent man's actions or behaviors, in which case a defendant who invokes the Alford plea is protected from admitting actual guilt and a more severe punishment. Conversely, I also understand the judge and jury's need for admitted liability before convicting a defendant of guilt. In this case, however, I lean more towards the former than the latter, mostly because I disagree on principle with the stark "guilty" or "not guilty" ideals with which the judge and jury tend to conform.

In this case, as in most, the shades of grey are most important in matters of black and white.

Stare Decisis: Hypocrisy or Justice?

My understanding of the concept "stare decisis," according to the text (p.55-58), is: future decisions bound to the governing of consistent prior decisions, or, more simply, precedent. Specifically, precedent is "the influence of prior cases on current cases;" moreover, stare decisis binds some judges and courts to "let the decision stand," just as it means in Latin.

I struggle with my opinion of stare decisis on both principle and practice.

I do agree that a judicial body should be able to alter or reverse a previous decision based on new information or circumstances. Note, though, that I do not commend making a practice of such changes as it would be highly harmful to the law and therefore society.

Conversely, my own sense of justice screams, "That's not fair!!" I have argued far too many times against the hypocrisy of double standards and unequal treatment to now become an advocate of such a weak, unbalanced, and irregular form of justice.

So where is the middle ground between such justice and hypocrisy? Should a decision made hundreds of years ago still be applied to cases today, despite the thousands of differences between the two worlds in which they were made? Should a just decision, under no circumstances, ever be threatened by reversal? How do we know when a practiced precedent is no longer just?

As usual, it all comes down to the details. Change is innate to human nature with the passing of time and should be accounted for in all aspects of law and justice. As our understanding of criminal motive develops, so should the sentencing for such criminals, while giving careful thought to the principles and ratio decendi for the original precedent. Even in a rapidly changing world, some decisions stand the test of time as true precedents for humanity.

I am still shaky on the details of the practice of stare decisis. I know, though, that there are cases in which I find it most effective and just, such as Brown v Board of Education and Wolf v. Colorado. On the other hand, I live in fear of such decisions as Hernandez v Texas and Roe v Wade being overruled at any time, near or far, in the future.

Overall, I have decided that I am a proponent of stare decisis and a fearer of its abuse. Long live hypocrisy, if only it serve justice.

http://courtoons.files.wordpress.com/2009/03/stare-decisis2.jpg

Chapter 2: Justice and the Law

For starters, this chapter, like the previous, deals mostly with lofty and abstract ideals and definitions, which I am not generally a fan of, no matter the topic. I am a realist in all senses of the word; therefore, I too, am one of those legal realists Dr. Ball keeps referring to in class. That said, I am assuredly learning quite a lot about an interesting subject, despite my personal preferences.

The introduction aptly illustrates "the tensions between the legal positivists and natural law advocates," as exemplified throughout the Nazi regime during World War II, in order to introduce the audience to the argument over wisdom and enforcement of some "'universal standards' with which all cultures must comply." Did the Allied forces have the right to try Nazi war criminals for "crimes [which were] legal under positivist Nazi law, [but] violated universal principles of civilized behavior and human dignity"? (p.27) My opinion: yes, they did, and, yes, we do.

In my lifetime, humanity has faced at least one atrocity in kind to the Holocaust: genocide in Darfur. This video link is a slightly sensationalized, but altogether impressive call to action against the widespread and systematic murder, rape, abduction, and displacement of thousands and thousands of humans.

http://vids.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=vids.individual&videoid=19692949

Beyond introductions, I also found Distributive justice interesting and relevant. I repeatedly hear Aristotle's definition of "just" welfare echoed by modern politicians, news correspondents, teachers, and and politically-aware citizens. According to Aristotle, "Help for the disabled, the temporarily unemployed, and for the formerly productive who by no fault of their own lack the capacity to function independently is considered just ... because such people have earned it by their past efforts."

"On the other hand, ... a woman who has three or four children out of wedlock and ... has never contributed anything to society [has real need] but it is self-induced and thus abusive of the welfare system and exploitative of those whose money is taken from them to support it. Providing such a person with needed resources may be decent and compassionate, but it is not ... just." (p.29) The comparison of yearly salaries amongst certain valuable or invaluable people is also a brilliant description of how distributive justice fails to meet every need for every contributor; for example, "athletes and actors, who contribute nothing to the community except entertainment, [make] more each year then an entire four-hundred-person police force, whose contributions to the community are enormous." (p.29) As a realist living in the mess of modern society, I must ultimately agree that "Justice is made to give everyone his due; to the rich his richness, to the poor his poverty." (Anatole France)

As far as Transcendental and Evolutionary perspectives go, I tend towards evolution with musings of transcendentalism.

I'm still not sure what equity is... other than a Latin derivative of the word "just," I keep thinking "Home Equity Loan" which I definitely don't understand. Really though, is it like Justice's vitamin, taken every day with breakfast, or is more like a 5-hour energy shot and used only when needed?

I like the idea of the Court of Chancery because stone-cold and unmerciful judges were directed to "view each case as unique, to be flexible and empathetic, and to think in terms of standards or principles of fairness rather than rules of law." (p.41) This is the first time intent is mentioned in the text. (Sigh of relief. Finally!) Honestly, the Court of Chancery's potential for corruption, unique outlook on criminals and citizens, plus its old-school name brings to mind The Canterbury Tales. Score. I digress...

I appreciate the texts honesty when it describes the crime control and due process models as extremes on the same continuum and then explains how, "no modern legal system competely conforms to either of these ideal types." (p.51) Legal adjustments to these models are required because both extremes can be exaggerated, as seen in several un-just Supreme Court cases .

Well, I'm completely new to blogging, but those are some of my thoughts on Chapter 2. Hopefully I'll get better at this.

Until next time.